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ABSTRACT 
For growth prospects, many oil dependent countries prepare their budget based on 
revenue from sales of crude oil. A number of studies have focused extensively on the 
relationship between growth and deficits, however, while controlling for other variables, 
the research investigated oil rent’s effect on fiscal balance in the presence of fiscal rules 
for oil dependent economies, and for selected net oil exporting countries, while 
controlling for the effects of some macroeconomic, budgetary, and political variables, 
such as government size, interest rate, unemployment rate, inflation rate, real GDP per 
capita, debt-to-GDP ratio, and control of corruption. The study relied on the strengths of 
past studies like those of Mika Tujula and Guido Wolswijk (2004) by establishing the 
specific effects of oil rents for crude oil endowed economies, as one of the main 
determinants of fiscal balance. This establishes the importance of oil rents, amongst 
other previously identified macroeconomic, budgetary, and political covariates. Thus, we 
have attempted to overcome the shortcomings of studies that make generalized 
conclusions for the main determinants of fiscal balance for all countries, without 
highlighting specific variables that takes a huge chunk of the effects for specific natural 
resource endowed economies. Given large macroeconomic panel dataset, our empirical 
analysis solved the possibility of endogeneity, simultaneity bias and unobserved 
heterogeneity of oil rents and fiscal balance by the main econometric technique i.e. using 
an instrumental variable approach based on Dynamic Panel estimators or the General 
Method of Moment (GMM). This is used in comparison with estimations from pooled 
OLS, LSDV fixed effects, and the IV/2SLS techniques (using each country’s share of 
world output as instrument). Our pre-estimation diagnostics showed that the GMM 
approach may not be applicable to the small sample, and we suspected that the IV/2SLS 
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method may also be weak in testing our hypothesis for the oil dependent economies with 
N = 20 and T = 16, and therefore we maintained the LSDV Fixed effects estimations as 
our main result for this category of sample countries selected. We also utilized the 
Drisc/Kraay standard errors, as well as the robust standard errors, which are standard 
errors robust to cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedasticity of unknown forms 
respectively, that exists in large macroeconomic panel data where N > T. Our estimation 
results shows that in countries with fiscal rules, there is insignificant reaction of fiscal 
balance to changes in oil rents shocks, and the impact is weak. We find also that welfare 
spending, which was captured by the real GDP per capita, affects fiscal balance, and so 
does the budgetary variable, i.e. debt-to-GDP ratio, and the ability of the government to 
curb corruption and mismanagement of funds, which is politically motivated. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal Balance, Oil Rents, Oil Dependent Economies, Net Oil Exporting Countries, 
Control of Corruption Index, Welfare, etc 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study and Overview  
One of the fundamental macroeconomic objective of the government is to achieve 
increased growth of its gross domestic product (GDP), and expand economic activities. 
However, in recent times, annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices has declined in 
many countries, or at best, remain stable. On the global trend, it has struggled to roam around 
3%, as shown in figure 1. The downward trend of growth rates respond to changes in the 
components of the gross value added by producers of goods and services currently operating in 
the economy1. Among several variables that interact with growth, there is a direct relationship 
between budget balance (deficits) and economic growth. This relationship derives from high 
investment costs that is usually not properly optimized or modelled in budget decisions in most 
countries (Arjomand, Emami, and Salimi 2016). 
Figure 1: GDP growth (annual %) 
 
In view of the link between investment costs, as correlates of revenue in determining 
fiscal balance, therefore, one budgetary item that matters for economic growth in oil rich 
                                                          
1
 World Bank Database, and OECD National Accounts 
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economies is oil rents. Oil rents are basically revenue less costs, and posits a clear picture of an 
oil dependent country’s oil wealth, as compared with oil production volumes. Thus, among 
several budget items, government’s gross revenue is largely sensitive to changes in crude oil 
price, and attracts consequences for overall economy in the presence of shocks. Past studies have 
clamored for less dependence on oil-related tax-revenues, and for more investment in high 
technology, so as to establish an exogenous and genuine driver of economic growth 
(Azhgaliyeva 2014; Reyes-Loya and Blanco 2008). 
In addition, irrespective of foreign and domestic debt levels, a country with a drive for 
favourable fiscal balance, is likely to stand strong in the face of an oil shock, hence such country 
is referred to as been fiscally sustainable. A favourable fiscal balance is however made possible 
when there are active fiscal rules. Fiscal rules are used as devices to mitigate against improper 
behaviour of major fiscal variables, such as revenue, expenditure, and procedures or volumes of 
new debts. It is usually set for a time frame, and yields potential consequences if not adhered to 
by fiscal authorities. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Fiscal balance determinants in most countries, and its link with economic growth remains 
an important area of fiscal policy and public finance, and it requires further study, especially for 
oil rich countries. This is because oil rich countries tend to borrow for recurrent spending, 
amazingly during oil peaks, as contrasted to standard expectations. The rising trend in 
government debt over the last decade is quite alarming. This is because debt is an important 
component of fiscal balance, and debt-to-GDP ratio has been on increase (Checherita-Westphal 
and Rother 2012), which results in rising deficits in turn. 
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The paradox between international crude oil price peak seasons, rising crude oil revenue 
and falling fiscal balance (or rising budget deficits) is somewhat established and investigated as 
not just economically motivated, but also politically motivated. Although, there are several 
macroeconomic models that incorporates government’s optimizing behaviour, these models only 
explain fiscal balance partially, therefore, it is reasonable to consider the challenges of political 
management by the government. This is owing to some tendencies for huge deficits, when the 
government is weak, due to the structure of the government (Roubini and Sachs 1989).  
Since the 2014 to 2015 crude oil price fall, its effects on fiscal sustainability have not 
been accounted for, given that most oil dependent countries suffered some level of fiscal crisis, 
ranging from weak fiscal stimulus, increased borrowing, and inability to meet up with very basic 
public financial obligations, amongst others. This paper thus serve as a supportive evidence, and 
uses recent data to investigate the relationship among these variables vis-à-vis, oil rents, debt-to-
GDP, and real GDP per capita. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The following are the research questions, which this study seeks to answer:  
I. What is the effect of oil rents on fiscal balance in oil dependent economies? 
II. What is the effect of oil rents on fiscal balance in oil dependent economies with fiscal 
rules? 
III. What is the role of rising welfare spending on fiscal balance? 
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1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The broad objective of this study is to investigate whether there is a causal link between 
oil rents and fiscal balance measured by the gap between revenue and costs for oil dependent 
economies over the period of 2000 – 2015, and compare estimations from a larger sample 
covering 1991 – 2015.   
This broad objective is divided into two specific objectives:  
I. To investigate whether there exists a causal effect between oil rents and fiscal balance 
in oil dependent countries. 
II. To determine the role of selected economic, political, and budgetary variables that 
influence fiscal balance. 
 
1.5 Hypotheses 
i. Oil rents have positive impacts in determining the fiscal balance of an oil dependent 
economy, especially during oil price peaks 
iii. Rising Oil rents does not have impacts unless met with falling debt-to-GDP ratio 
Of all three variables identified in the literature, I expect Oil Rents to outperform the 
impact of rising real GDP per capita, control of corruption index, and falling debt-to-GDP on 
fiscal balance of oil dependent economies. 
This study will test the hypothesis that oil rents does affect fiscal rents in oil dependent 
countries, while observing other proven covariates. 
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1.6 Significance of the Study 
The effects of oil rents on fiscal balance, in the presence of welfare spending, and no 
fiscal rule is unknown and varies within oil dependent countries. Such information is critical for 
understanding the determinants of fiscal balance for a specific class of countries, and to provide 
group-specific policy recommendations on the use of oil rents in peak periods. It is in line with 
the above that this study focuses on oil dependent economies, as classified by the World Bank. 
The study also highlights important effects for countries with fiscal rules, which in this paper we 
assume as those countries with institutional arrangements that requires prudency in peak periods.  
This study will elucidate the effect of oil rents by examining its relationship with welfare 
spending, and corruption index, among other covariates for selected oil dependent economies. In 
addition, as discussed in the previous sections, oil dependent economies benefitted from crude 
oil price peak in late 2014 until mid-2015. These period also witnessed rising borrowing by 
many countries, and these were used on recurrent expenditures. As such, it provides an ideal 
sample for this study.  
Furthermore, the study will be vital to policy makers in oil dependent economies by 
helping them to understand the need for fiscal rules, and to determine appropriate policy 
interventions during oil boom era, so as to ensure improvement in fiscal balance. Hence, this in 
future will ultimately safeguard the government purse, and budgetary obligations of oil rich 
countries. 
 
1.7 Organization of the Paper 
The first chapter has introduced the topic under study and the rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: chapter two is the literature review subdivided into theoretical literature and empirical 
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literature survey. Chapter three presents the methodology used in the study. In chapter four and 
five, the study concludes with the major findings of the paper, and policy recommendation 
respectively. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Unlike in the private sector where objectives are market driven, and resources are 
influenced by market demand, many government budgets and activities are constrained by their 
resources i.e. mostly funded by revenue from tax, or in some cases revenue from natural 
resources such as crude oil. Activities are politically motivated in the latter, and most funding 
structures are in line with grants, settlements, and debts. Therefore, decisions are affected 
differently by different set of agents; in the private sector we have the shareholders, customers, 
labour force, and the management team; while in the public sector, we identify with the people, 
who are the users of service, and the political office holders. In line with this also, budget size is 
usually large in the public sector, resulting in deficits overtime. 
In the USA for example, the federal government has sustained high deficits since the 
1980s and enjoyed only few years of surpluses, akin to spending on welfare, Medicaid, wars, and 
other internal/external spending. The effects of deficit on the economy is however a debate in 
most countries, but is usually argued against. Therefore, decisions on the choice of method for 
financing government expenditure, although suggested by the Ricardian equivalence, and other 
tax smoothening hypotheses, is usually a political issue, and may not be appropriately modelled. 
 
2.1.1 Government Budget Constraint, Budget Deficits, and Fiscal Policy 
The basic government budget constraint describes what capacities lie in the government, 
and this is captured by the government’s budget constraint (Romer 2012). We follow the 
framework developed by David Romer (2012), and highlight some modification to the 
conclusions of the model. Learning from household’s individual budget set up, “the present 
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value of its consumption must be less than or equal to its initial wealth plus the present value of 
its labour income”. We follow a similar trend to construct the government’s budget constraint: 
∫    ( ) ( )     ( )  ∫    ( )
 
   
 ( )   
 
   
               ( ) 
 ( )   ∫  ( )                                                                                  ( )
 
   
 
The present value of government’s purchases of goods and services must be less than or 
equal to its initial wealth plus the present value of its tax receipts (net of transfer payments), 
taken as a proxy for total government revenue in this baseline model. G(t) and T(t) denote the 
government’s real purchases and taxes at time t, and D(0) is the initial real debt outstanding.  ( ) 
is the real interest rate at time ( ). We refer to D(0) as government’s debt rather than wealth, 
which is negative. 
We infer also from the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model on the optimal savings for a 
society, which suggest that household wealth cannot assume a negative value, so is the 
government debt D(0). Also, since the interest rate maintains a positive value, the government 
cannot pay off its debt. Hence, the government is motivated to permanently remain indebted, or 
even increase its borrowing, since the limit of the present value of its debt cannot be positive.  
Furthermore, if the government is always borrowing, and uses a fiscal policy where the 
real interest rate exceeds the rate of growth of debt, equation (1) is satisfied and the fiscal 
balance (government budget balance) is negative. Thus, we can pose a frontier definition of 
fiscal balance, or budget deficit as the rate of change of the stock of debt. This rate of change is 
given as: 
˙. 
D(t) = [G (t) - T (t)] + r (t)D(t)     (3) 
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Where equation (3) refers to the rate at which the debt stock changes being equal to 
revenue less expenditure, added to the real interest on the debt stock. Since G(t) – T(t) is usually 
referred to as the government’s primary deficit, we can measure the government’s constraint by 
focusing on performance of fiscal policy.  
 
2.1.2 Modified Model  
Focusing on the conventional measures of primary deficits and debt stocks, at a point in 
time may yield misleading measures of actual fiscal performance, therefore it is reasonable to 
consider the present value of the whole expenditure and revenue paths of the government. We 
can modify the preceding equations to accommodate macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, 
a cogent budgetary variable such as oil rents for oil dependent economies, since it accounts for a 
large portion of revenue, and political variable such as corruption index: 
 .˙ 
B(t) = P(t)[G (t) - T (t) – OR(t)] + i (t )P(t )D(t)    (4) 
Where P(t) is the price level and i(t) is the nominal interest rate, and if we accommodate nominal 
and real relationships between nominal interest rate and the inflation rate, we find that: 
 
 ( )
 ( )
  ( )   ( ) ( )                                                       ( ) 
This means that in as much as the debt stock is positive for any country [D(t)], the conventional 
or nominal primary deficits [B(t)] rises, when the inflation [π(t)] rises, even when it is deflated 
by the price level [P(t)]. Impliedly, when we interact fiscal rules, or introduce other political or 
macroeconomic variables in equation 5, we can capture the response of government’s budget 
constraint, to several variables in an economy, and implicitly understand the behaviour of fiscal 
balance. 
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2.2 Empirical Literature Survey 
Given that fiscal policy and monetary policy are important macroeconomic policies that 
shape the economy, and to understand the determinants of budget deficits, and fiscal balance of 
most countries, several researchers have made efforts to grasp the connection between 
macroeconomic, political, and budgetary variables, and budget deficits. They have particularly 
highlighted the relevance of rising debt and falling economic growth performance in determining 
the fiscal stance of a country.  
While some studies showed that interest rates, unemployment rate, economic growth rate, 
and inflation rates, are major determinants of fiscal performance, others highlighted political 
variables such as fiscal autonomy of sub-national government, control of corruption index, and 
transparency of the budget, as significant above all other variables. Consequently, due to 
consistency and inconsistencies of several findings, this paper proceeds to use case studies of oil 
exporting countries, while highlighting the presence or absence of fiscal rules, as a strategy to 
find out significance or causal effects of several class of determinants of fiscal balance. 
 
2.2.1 Literature on Determinants of Fiscal Balance, Debt, and Growth 
 Arjomand, Emami, and Salimi (2016) as well as Afonso and Jalles (2013) found a direct 
link between economic growth and variables such as inflation, while noting an indirect 
relationship between budget deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio and also labour productivity. Their 
findings showed that higher debt maturity leads to higher economic growth, which in turn lead to 
has effects on government’s fiscal performance. In other words, at times of financial crisis, there 
are adverse growth effects, thus efforts to consolidate fiscal efforts of the government, and 
improve on basic debt ratios, are capable of improving total factor productivity and also enhance 
overall growth performance. 
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In their multivariate regression analysis, covariates such as gross fixed capital formation, 
public investment, Real GDP per capita, and labor productivity were significant but not with 
expected effects. In a similar approach, Baum, Checherita-Westphal, and Rother (2013) found 
that the effects of debt on the growth rate of GDP in the short-run is positive, and has very high 
significance. However, this effect is almost extinct when public debt-to-GDP rises to about 67% 
of the total debt. Also, other variables such as trade openness measure, and the ratio of gross 
capital formation to GDP have their individual effects and are statistically significant in 
determining economic performance. 
 Tujula, Mika; Guido (2004), investigated the variables that affects fiscal balance of 
OECD countries and found that amongst many variables, long-term nominal interest rates, rate 
of unemployment, real GDP growth, affects budget deficit. Also, certain political variables were 
found to be significant, such as election years, government type, whether democratic or military, 
as well as political stability in the country influences fiscal balance. Thus, the authors found that 
fiscal balance falls rapidly during election years. Furthermore, during economic recessions, asset 
prices adversely affects fiscal balance, and can be correlated with economic, political, and 
institutional set-ups in the country. According to Woo, (2003), sociopolitical variables do not 
greatly affect government’s budget balance when there are sound institutional settings. 
 In addition, Mercan, (2014), found that the sustainability of budget deficits matters in 
overall fiscal performance of a country. Using a sample of 18 OECD countries from 1980 to 
2012, the paper found that the ratio of budget deficit to GDP, and government’s general 
expenditure influences budget deficits, and for the sample selected, budget deficits were weakly 
sustainable over the period covered. Also, a sum up of these determinants of fiscal balance are 
not unconnected to the leading findings of Roubini and Sachs (1989). Their study gave strong 
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support for both political and economic institutions as major determinants of fiscal balance. 
However, much emphasis is placed on the structure of the former having more influence. 
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), using a similar methodology for 20 OECD countries, 
empirically found that ‘the number of spending ministers has a strong and very robust effect on 
expenditure, particularly during the period that includes the large macroeconomic shocks’ (p. 
100). This means that government size is usually as a result of alliances in the electoral process, 
and these has potential causal impacts on fiscal performance. 
  
2.2.2 Literature on relationship between Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Balance 
 On the other hand, several other studies have investigated the importance of a number of 
fiscal rules, such as expenditure or spending rules, revenue rules, as well as debt rules, as they 
influence fiscal performance of a country. van Wijnbergen and Budina (2011), found that due to 
uncertainty in future flows of revenue and expenditure of the government, stock of debt, and 
primary deficits are adversely affected. This is particularly worst for natural resource rich 
countries, therefore, an establishment of “feedback rules” as it interacts with revenue from sale 
of natural resources, will help reduce the difference, and help alleviate deficits (p. 24). Such 
feedback rules therefore targets set levels of budgetary components, and can mitigate 
mismanagement of resources. This finding is consistent with Maliszewski (2009). The author 
showed that due to inconsistencies and rising production and adjustment costs of crude oil, 
welfare spending are delicate to models of fiscal rules, thus, revenue from non-oil activities 
should be distributed carefully given falling crude oil reserves. 
 von Hagen and Harden (1995) by showing an explanation for continually rising 
government debt, and therefore budget deficits in selected OECD countries, found that the 
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budget process is highly uncertain, hence, the need for fiscal rules. However, their empirical 
results shows that commitment to rules, based on sound institutions is severely necessary, else, 
the government is lured into a fiscal illusion. In addition, Bohn and Inman (1996), selected a 
specific fiscal rule, i.e. balanced-budget rule, and drew evidence from states in the US. 
Historically, the US has recorded consistent deficit spending, and thus the authors investigated 
why this is so despite the fiscal rule in place. They found that given the several revenue sources 
available to the government, deficits can only be ameliorated if there are government spending 
cuts, rather than increases in taxes. Thus, while using selected economic and political controls, as 
well as a dummy measure for fiscal rule in their panel regressions, their results and conclusions 
shows that when a balanced-budget rule is set, the overall performance of such rules are at the 
mercy of legislative decisions, and in general the political atmosphere. 
 
2.3 Justification 
This paper is very important for oil dependent economies, and its findings would 
significantly contribute to the current literature. This paper is one of the few to interact fiscal 
rules with oil rents, and present pooled OLS, Fixed effects, and IV estimations in comparison, 
for two different set of classification of countries.  
The essence of this comparison is to comprehend the various under/overestimated causal 
effects of variables (determinants) on fiscal balance, and to highlight individual significance of 
macroeconomic variables, budgetary variables, and political variables into one category. Thus, 
the results of various estimation techniques from this paper will give new insights to the current 
literature on fiscal balance, welfare spending, debt-to-GDP effects, as well as the essence of 
fiscal rules in a unified framework, as against the conventional government budget constraint.  
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3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1 Methodology 
Based on the objective of this paper, to test the hypothesis stated, we make use of causal 
inference models with longitudinal data; linear dynamic panel model and static panel data 
estimators.  
Longitudinal/panel data is a distinct case of pooled time-series cross-section in which the 
same cross-section such as entities (e.g. states, companies, individuals, and countries) is 
measured over time. In this study, the cross-section includes a sample of 20 selected oil 
dependent economies, and yearly observations of a number of variables were collected.  
In using panel data, we adjust for individual heterogeneity, get more informative data, as 
well as variability, efficiency and good degrees of freedom. Also, we benefit from less collinear 
relationship among regressors. This leads to the building and testing of more complex behavioral 
models, and longitudinal unit root tests that possess standard asymptotic distributions.   
A problem to overcome with panel data is the homogeneity assumption, and though 
formal tests exist that would evaluate its validity, there is a possibility of cross-sectional 
dependence that would complicate the analysis. As such, certain methods and tests need 
balanced panels and cross-country data consistency.  
Pre-Estimation 
The study presents the summary statistics of the variables used, scatter plot of these 
variables, and a correlation matrix. The study proceed to test for heteroskedasticity, and to decide 
on whether to use the fixed effects of random effects estimation techniques, after conducting the  
Hausman specification test. Finally, the paper also carried out the test for Instrument Relevance, 
so as to apply the right and valid instrumental variable 
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Estimation 
This study makes use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with pooled data, proceeds to 
applying either Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) estimation methods depending on 
Hausman specification test. The paper finally uses the instrumental variable approach based on 
two-stage least squares. These three econometric methods helps to confirm the robustness of the 
findings across distinct techniques. 
To start with, a simple strategy is to estimate the model in equation (1) and (2) using OLS 
regression. However, there are problems with this strategy. Two of these problems include; 
endogeneity problems which may be due to the capturing of reverse causality issue or the effect 
of some of the omitted variables (e.g., geographical characteristics, culture and so on); and the 
possibility of measurement error of our variables of interest (fiscal deficit and oil rents). This is 
because such errors will load into other variables. 
If not corrected, these two problems will yield OLS estimates that do not correspond to 
the causal effect of oil rents on fiscal balance. Thus, upward or downward biases are possible.  
The next strategy is therefore to use either the fixed effects or random effects panel data 
model. This model is reasonably effective to figure out the causes of changes within a sample.  
Thus, the fixed or random effects model controls for all time-invariant differences between the 
selected oil dependent economies, so that the estimated coefficients are unbiased because of 
omitted time-invariant characteristics such as fiscal rule or policy changes, budget structure, 
amongst others. 
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As all the variables are time-invariant, this model is appropriate to establish a causal 
effect of oil rents on fiscal balance in oil dependent economics. The model is specified as 
follows: 
FBit = βi + β1ORit + γ0Zit + εit                                          (2) 
where the dependent variable FBit stands for fiscal balance of country i in period t. ORit is the 
main variable of interest, and it is country i's oil rents in period t. Bi represents the country fixed-
effect and Zi is a set of other control variables that includes Debt to GDP ratio, Real GDP per 
Capita, Government Expenditure (Size), Interest rate, unemployment rate, inflation rate, and 
control of corruption index 𝜀it stands for the error term. 
Despite the fact that the fixed or random effects techniques can solve individual as well 
as time effects and can adjust for heteroskedasticity, and they seem plausible compared to pooled 
OLS, they generally need certain assumptions to be fulfilled, for instance, strict exogeneity 
assumption.  
Thus, the shortcomings of RE and FE is that they are centered on country-specific effects 
and do not consider for stationarity, dynamics and endogeneity. 
Oil rents could be potentially endogenous in oil dependent economies’ fiscal balance 
regressions in the existence of omitted variables, measurement errors and reverse causality. For 
example, economic adjustments, changes in demographic characteristics of oil rigs and political 
regime changes or upheavals are potential to be omitted variables correlated with oil rents.  
Statistical estimation compounded with these challenges may yield inconsistent and 
biased estimates. In order to handle the potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and 
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country fixed effects problems, this paper uses the instrumental variable approach based on 
using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) with distinct and plausible instrument for oil rents.  
This instrument variable is share of world output. This is expected to be correlated with 
oil rents, but uncorrelated with any of the determinants of fiscal balance. It is also orthogonal to 
any other omitted characteristics (i.e. uncorrelated with the outcomes of interest through any 
channel other than their effect via the endogenous variables).  
A successful instrumental variables approach would correct not only for the simultaneous 
and omitted variable biases but also for differential measurement error in the two endogenous 
variables as long as the measurement errors have the classical form (see Wooldridge 2002, chap. 
5 for details) and thus, we can parameters consistently. 
The GMM is used to estimate the panel data for the larger data set, where N > T. Since it 
assumes strict exogeneity and stationarity restrictions, this paper obtains robust estimates from 
the dynamic linear panel, and also interacts fiscal rules with oil rents to capture the importance of 
fiscal rules in oil dependent economies. Furthermore, the paper uses two data samples; the first is 
with 20 countries for 16years, while the second is with 61 countries for 25years. The latter is for 
selected net oil exporting countries, while the former is for selected oil dependent economies. 
 
Post-Estimation Diagnostics/Robustness Checks 
In order to confirm robustness, the study carried out the tests of endogeneity (Oil Rents 
are indeed endogenous or not), the first stage regression statistics, to test for weak instruments, 
and the tests of overidentifying restrictions, to test for instruments validity. 
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3.2 Model specification 
We specify two models to examine oil rent’s effect on fiscal balance. The first model 
contains oil rents and a set of control variables. The baseline model to investigate oil dependent 
countries specific oil rent’s effect on fiscal balance takes the form: 
FBit = β0 + β1ORit + β2ORit*FRit + γ0Zit + εit                                           (6) 
where fiscal balance is the dependent variable defined by country’s budget deficit, OR is the oil 
rents, OR*FR is the interaction of oil rents and oil dependent countries with fiscal rule and Zi is a 
vector of other economic control variables believed to influence fiscal balance. The control 
variables consist of Debt to GDP ratio, Real GDP per Capita, Government Expenditure (Size), 
Interest rate, unemployment rate, inflation rate, and control of corruption index. γ0 is a vector of 
coefficient estimates of the control variables, i= 1,….., N and t = 1,…..,T are correspondingly the 
distinct and temporal magnitudes of the panel, βi is the country fixed effects and εit is an 
idiosyncratic error term. 
Furthermore, to cater for potential endogeneity of oil rents and all explanatory variables, the 
study introduce the instrumental variable model. Given the linear regression: 
a. Regress ORit on SWOit, and Zit to obtain OR^it estimate     (7) 
ORit = α0 + α1SWOit + γ0Zit + εit         (8) 
where SWOit is the instrumental variable 
b. Plug in the fitted values of ORit estimated derived from the equation (1) into the original linear 
regression equation 
FBit = β0 + β1OR^it + γ0Zit + εit                                         (9) 
where εit is a composite error term that is uncorrelated with ORit estimated and other regressors. 
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In applying the dynamic panel (GMM-IV) technique to mitigate potential endogeneity of 
oil rents, the moment conditions whereby lags of the dependent variable – fiscal balance and the 
first differences of the exogenous variables – oil rents are instruments for the first-differenced 
equation. The equation to estimate is given as: 
FBit = αi + β1FBit-1 + β2ORit + γ0Zit + εit                                           (10) 
Where FBit-1 is lagged fiscal balance, which helps yield robustness in the dynamics of 
adjustment for fiscal balance, and we also specify another model to capture the interaction 
between oil rents and fiscal rules for all the samples selected.  
FBit = αi + β1FBit-1 + β2ORit + β3ORit*FRit + γ0Zit + εit                                       (11) 
ORit*FRit captures the interaction between oil rents and fiscal balance. Also, to gratify for the 
possibility of cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedasticity, and improve reliability and 
confidence level of the estimates, we apply the Driscoll-Kraay and the robust standard errors 
respectively. 
3.3 Definition of Variables 
Table 3.1 Description of Dependent, Independent, and Policy Variables 
Category Measured by Definition 
Outcome Variable 
(Fiscal Balance) 
Budget Balance 
– BB 
General government overall fiscal balance expressed as a percentage of GDP 
Policy Variable 
(Oil Rents) 
Oil Rents (OR) Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total 
costs of production. Higher oil rents is expected to translate to lower deficits and an improved 
fiscal balance 
Control Variables Interest Rate Lending rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short- and medium-term financing needs of 
the private sector. This rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of 
borrowers and objectives of financing. The terms and conditions attached to these rates differ 
by country, however, limiting their comparability. A high interest rate leads to low fiscal 
balance. Debts become expensive and fiscal balance poorly reacts (Eschenbach and 
Schuknecht 2002). 
 Unemployment 
Rate/Output 
growth/Output 
Gap 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and 
seeking employment. This captures fiscal response to changes in the macro economy, as well 
as stabilization policies used during different cyclical fluctuations. Budget deficits would 
increase, leading to worsening fiscal balance in poor economic times for example. Hence, a 
negative relationship a priori. 
 Debt-to-GDP 
ratio (DGDP) 
The debt-to-GDP ratio measures the fiscal sustainability of the government. It is negatively 
related to fiscal balance. High DGDP leads to high interest payments and worsens budget 
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Category Measured by Definition 
balance. 
 Share of World 
Output (SWO) 
Oil production, 1000 bbl. per day as a share of total world output. 
Welfare level Real GDP per 
Capita 
In order to finance catching-up expenditure projects, government engage in deficit financing, 
which negatively affects overall fiscal balance (Woo 2003) 
 Inflation (INF) Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the 
cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or 
changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
Through price-indexation of receipts, inflation may erode competitiveness and risks causing 
pressures on exchange rates, and also negatively affect investment and growth, which 
determines fiscal performance in the end (Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999) 
 Control of 
corruption 
(-2.5 weak; 2.5 
strong) 
The index for Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
capture of the state by elites and private interests. A weak index adversely affects fiscal 
balance. 
 Oil reserves, 
billion barrels 
Proved reserves of crude oil are the estimated quantities of all liquids defined as crude oil, 
which geological and engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be recoverable 
in future years from reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions. 
 Oil production, 
thousand barrels 
per day 
Oil production includes the production of crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas 
plant liquids, and other liquids, and refinery processing gain. Negative values indicate a net 
refinery processing loss. 
3.4 Expected Results 
Hypotheses: 
i. Oil rents have positive impacts in determining the fiscal balance of an oil dependent 
economy, especially during oil price peaks 
ii. Rising Oil rents does not have impacts unless met with falling debt-to-GDP ratio 
iii. Of all three variables identified in the literature, I expect Oil Rents to outperform the 
impact of rising real GDP per capita, control of corruption index, and falling debt-to-
GDP on fiscal balance of oil dependent economies. 
 
Table 3.2 Variables and expected signs 
Given the models specified in equations above, the variables’ expected coefficient results are as 
follows: 
Variable Expected Sign 
Oil Rents Positive 
Interest rate Negative 
Debt-to-GDP ratio Negative 
Share of World Output Positive 
Real GDP Positive 
Government Expenditure (Size) Negative 
Unemployment rate Negative 
Control of corruption Positive 
Inflation rate Negative 
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3.5 Data and Sources 
Data used in the regression model are described in this section. The dependent variable is 
the fiscal balance measured in constant dollars, from the International Monetary Fund (Fiscal 
Monitor) 2016. A set of control variables are also included to alleviate the effect of omitted 
variables bias; these include Debt to GDP ratio, Real GDP per Capita, Government Expenditure 
(Size), Interest rate, unemployment rate, inflation rate, and control of corruption index. Real 
GDP and Debt to GDP are specified in Natural logs. 
Data of 20 selected oil dependent economies, and 61 net oil exporting economies (all 
listed in the appendix), as classified by the World Bank; Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 
Angola, Oman, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Chad, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Iran, UAE, Ecuador, Algeria, 
Nigeria, Russia, Qatar, Norway and Mexico within 2000 – 2015, and 1991 – 2015 respectively. 
All have annual data for the period under consideration, and all the variables are taken from 
International Monetary Fund, except Real GDP per capita constant and Oil rents, which are taken 
from WDI dataset 2015. 
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4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section provides a detailed account of the pre-estimation tests carried out, findings 
obtained from employing pooled OLS, FE, IV/2SLS estimations, as well as the GMM-IV results 
obtained from equations 6 – 11, and robustness checks. The tables below shows general 
empirical results from regression established on the selected countries included in the sample, 
and in all regressions there is an interaction variable of oil rents with fiscal rules OR*FR to 
assess policy-specific effects. 
Pre-Estimation Diagnostics 
Summary Statistics 
The following table describes the summary of variables used for the various estimations 
carried out; pooled-OLS, Fixed effects, 2SLS IV, and GMM-IV methods of analysis. Summary 
statistics like mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are included.   
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FISCALBALANCE 1,525 -1.556407 7.920877 -151.3092 43.30262 
 320 4.231864 12.06175 -53.54418 43.30262 
OILRENTS 1,525 9.745609 14.09884 0 67.19 
 320 29.93052 15.56427 1.3087 69.55 
FISCALRULE 1,525 .2216393 .4154859 0 1 
 320 .2125 .4097174 0 1 
DEBTTOGDPRATIO 1,525 50.44709 39.48863 .35 316.43 
 320 28.8846 30.87289 .318164 342.666 
GOVTSIZE 1,525 16.26553 7.409091 2.06 83.25 
 320 15.05224 5.736349 4.16 42.51 
INTRATE 1,522 6.985447 13.26961 -94.22 130.78 
 320 12.19459 12.25829 3.1 103.16 
UR 1,525 8.208072 5.307975 .16 29.77 
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 320 7.760938 5.412566 .3 29.9 
REALGDPPERCAPITA 1,525 16060.21 19246.78 257.11 91593.67 
 320 19526.16 23659.15 462.49 91593.6 
INFRATE 1,525 51.39286 649.0846 -10.6 23773.1 
 320 9.825378 24.10024 -10.0675 324.997 
CONTROLOFCORRUPTION 1,514 .0165125 1.081607 -2.06 2.55 
 320 -.3582437 .9733198 -1.69 2.3 
SHAREOFWORLDOUTPUT 1,525 1.4872 3.780252 .01 27.89 
 320 4.065062 5.223079 .07 25.88 
LOGRGDP 1,525 8.838885 1.428702 5.549504 11.42512 
 320 9.191847 1.222149    6.136625    11.42512 
LOGDGDP 1,525 3.624688 .8557518 -1.049822 5.757102 
 320 2.903137 1.071646   -1.145188    5.836756 
OILRENTS*FISCALRULE 1,525 1.502009 6.32277 0 62.17 
 320 4.184702 9.123902          0       39.33 
Note: The values in italics are data of the sample of 20 oil dependent countries employed in the 
study 
From the data, the mean of all net oil exporting countries is negative, and these group of 
countries have even larger deficits or fiscal balance, compared to the heavily oil dependent 
countries. In fact, countries in the Middle East, and in Africa have fiscal balance above the 
country averages. However, no low or middle income country has fiscal balance close to the 
mean of any of the OECD countries included in the larger sample. 
 In the case of oil rents, oil dependent countries have country averages larger than selected 
net oil exporting countries. Thus, the large amount of oil rents for the former can be considered 
as a justification for their dependency on crude oil revenues in budgetary decisions.  
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Bin Scatter Plots 
In order to understand the link between fiscal balance and oil rents, the study utilizes the 
bin scatter plots, which is a non-parametric approach of understanding the link among variables. 
Since the bin scatter plot first groups oil rents into equal-sized bins, and then computes the 
averages of fiscal balance and oil rents within each bin, the scatterplot created is representative 
of the behaviour of the population, not just the selected samples included in this study (Chetty, 
Raj, John N Friedman 2013; Stepner 2014) 
Figure 2 Bin Scatter Plots of Fiscal Balance and Oil Rents 
Panel A: Fiscal Balance and Oil Rents for Net Oil Exporting Countries 
(I)       (II) 
  
Graph (I) includes a dummy variable i.e. fiscal rules, and plots the bin scatter points, 
showing that without fiscal rules, the scatter points are dispersed around the regression line, but 
tight to the regression line when there are fiscal rules. This mean that the slope is imprecisely 
estimated without fiscal rules, and regression standard error is large, but is otherwise with the 
presence of fiscal rule. 
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I include the control of corruption index in Graph (II). This is useful, as it accommodates 
a control for covariates before plotting the relationship. Thus it shows the relationship between 
fiscal balance and oil rents, when we control for the corruption index. As shown above, given 
that the binned scatter points are tight to the regression line, the slope is precisely estimated, 
whether there is fiscal rule or not, hence, the regression standard error is small, which indicates 
statistical significance. 
Panel B: Fiscal Balance and Oil Rents for Oil dependent countries 
(III)       (IV) 
  
For Oil dependent economies, graph (III) shows a positive relationship between fiscal 
balance and oil rents. This positive relationship is however steeper when there is fiscal rules. It is 
almost constant, and may be statistically insignificant without adding any covariates. However, 
in graph (IV), the bin scatter points, shows a positive relationship between fiscal balance and oil 
rents, when we include a covariate. The dispersion of bin scatter points across the line is however 
uncertain and is shown in several regression estimates that follows in subsequent sections of this 
paper. One obvious point to note is that the strength and direction of relationship between fiscal 
balance and oil rents is affected when other covariates are included. 
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Correlation Matrix 
Table 4.2 shows Pearson correlations for selected variables. All the independent variables 
selected are significantly related to fiscal balance in net oil exporting countries. However, in oil 
dependent economies, government spending is insignificantly related to fiscal balance. 
Also, in oil dependent economies, apart from debt-to-GDP ratio, real GDP per capita and 
control of corruption index, the association with fiscal balance is not very strong, but large 
sample feature, and control of cross country dependence may induce the statistical signiﬁcance 
of each.  
The strongest association is between control of corruption index and our selected measure 
of welfare spending i.e. real GDP per capita. The flow of government spending on welfare to the 
improvement in life expectancy and general welfare of citizens is mostly hampered by corruption 
in many oil-rich economies. Thus, as expected, the more corruption is controlled for, the more 
welfare improvement an economy enjoys.  
As expected also, the sign of the association between debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal 
balance is negative, and is established in both group of sample countries. 
Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix for selected variables 
   Panel (A) – For selected net oil exporting countries 
 Fiscal 
Balance  
OilRents  GovtSize logRGDP logDGDP Control of 
Corruption 
Fiscal 
Balance 
1.0000       
OilRents 0.3682*   1.0000      
 0.0000      
GovtSize -0.1584*   0.0088    1.0000     
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 0.0000    0.7301     
logRGDP 0.1233*  -0.0351    0.4107* 1.0000    
 0.0000    0.1712    0.0000    
logDGDP -0.0562*  -0.0801*  -0.0368 -0.0735* 1.0000   
 0.0282    0.0018    0.1509 0.0041   
Control of 
Corruption 
0.0639*  -0.2601*   0.2701* 0.6878* 0.0456 1.0000 
 0.0129    0.0000    0.0000 0.0000 0.0760  
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level 
 
   Panel (B) – For selected oil dependent countries 
 Fiscal 
Balance  
OilRents  GovtSize logRGDP logDGDP Control of 
Corruption 
Fiscal Balance 1.0000       
OilRents 0.2259*   1.0000     
 0.0000      
GovtSize 0.0774    0.1365*   1.0000     
 0.1674    0.0145     
logRGDP 0.4574*  -0.1348*   0.3967* 1.0000    
 0.0000    0.0158    0.0000    
logDGDP -0.3865*  -0.1002   -0.0740 -0.2874* 1.0000   
 0.0000    0.0736    0.1868 0.0000   
Control of 
Corruption 
0.4598*  -0.2676*   0.3014* 0.8403* -0.1899*   1.0000  
 0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 0.0000 0.0006  
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Test for Cross-Sectional Dependence 
Given that cross-sectional dependence (CD), and contemporaneous correlation, is usually 
in macro panels that spans above 15-30 years, we conduct the Pesaran’s CD test. This helps us to 
test whether the residuals are correlated across entities in the samples selected to represent oil 
dependent countries, so as to avoid bias in tests results (a.k.a. contemporaneous correlation).  
Table 4.3 Test for Cross-Sectional Dependence 
H0: Residuals are not correlated Selected oil dependent 
economies 
All Net Exporting 
Countries 
Pesaran's test of cross sectional 
independence  
2.885, Pr. = 0.0039 11.645, Pr. = 0.0000 
Average absolute value of the off-
diagonal elements  
0.303 0.291 
 
Since the P. value < 0.5, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that there is 
cross-sectional dependence among selected oil dependent economies. Hence, we proceed to use 
the Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, which is a robust standard error for panel regressions 
with cross-sectional dependence. 
Standard Hausman test 
Here, the null hypothesis of no ﬁxed eﬀ ects has to be rejected at the 10% level. Because 
of the marginal rejection of the null hypothesis, the regression model in the model specification 
section of this paper (equation 6) should be estimated by ﬁxed eﬀ ects regression to ensure 
consistency of the results. 
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Table 4.4 Result of Hausman Tests 
H0: Difference in coefficients 
not systemic 
Oil Dependent Economies Net Oil Exporting 
Countries 
Chi
2
 16.74 0.0529 
Prob > Chi
2
 79.10 0.0000 
 
An argument for the RE-FGLS 
Although pooled OLS regression yields consistent coeﬃcient estimates when the random 
eﬀ ects model is true, its coeﬃcient estimates are ineﬃcient under the null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test. Therefore, pooled OLS regression should not be used when testing for ﬁxed 
eﬀ ects. Because feasible GLS estimation is both consistent and eﬃcient, respectively, under the 
null hypothesis of the Hausman test, it is more appropriate to compare the coeﬃcient estimates 
obtained from FGLS with those of the FE estimator (Hoechle 2009). Due to numerical reasons, 
Wooldridge (2002, p. 290) recommends to perform the Hausman test for ﬁxed eﬀ ects with either 
the ﬁxed eﬀ ects or the random eﬀ ects estimates of the error. Thanks to the Hausman command’s 
option sigmamore, Stata makes it simple to perform a standard Hausman test in the way 
suggested by Wooldridge (2002) 
 
Provided that the Hausman test applied here is valid (which it probably is not), the null 
hypothesis of no ﬁxed-eﬀ ects is rejected on the 5% level of signiﬁcance. Therefore, the standard 
Hausman test leads to the conclusion that pooled OLS estimation is likely to produce 
inconsistent coeﬃcient estimates for the regression model in (10). As a result, the regression 
model in (10) should be estimated by ﬁxed eﬀ ects (within) regression. 
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Estimation Results: 
Given that the data collated are separated into oil dependent economies, and a larger set 
to cover for Net oil exporting countries, we present the results in two separate categories, and 
proceed to compare these estimations, and confirm consistencies, as well as robustness for each 
class of estimations. 
Oil Dependent Countries  
Pooled OLS 
 The pooled-OLS estimation is done by classifying initially, each class of variables as they 
influence fiscal balance alongside the policy variable, oil rents. 
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Table 4.5 Pooled OLS Estimation results 
Dependent Variable = Fiscal Balance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 
Policy + 
Macroeconomic  
Variable 
Model 2 
Macroeconomic 
+ Budgetary  
Variables 
Model 3 
All Variables + Political  
Variables 
Oil Rents 0.284*** 0.265*** 0.305*** 
 (0.0797) (0.0624) (0.0668) 
Interest Rate 0.0872 0.156* 0.145** 
 (0.0626) (0.0746) (0.0596) 
Unemployment Rate -0.581** -0.462** -0.312 
 (0.221) (0.203) (0.226) 
Inflation Rate -0.0913* -0.0688 -0.0478 
 (0.0476) (0.0526) (0.0437) 
logRGDP 3.843*** 4.548*** 1.453* 
 (0.413) (0.601) (0.720) 
Govtsize  -0.372*** -0.372*** 
  (0.0930) (0.0749) 
logDGDP  -2.327*** -2.671*** 
  (0.289) (0.261) 
Control of Corruption   5.064*** 
   (1.211) 
Oilrents*Fiscalrule -0.0376 -0.0626 0.0355 
 (0.0621) (0.0559) (0.0601) 
Constant -35.09*** -30.54*** -2.124 
 (4.990) (5.946) (6.066) 
Observations 320 320 320 
R-squared 0.365 0.422 0.457 
Number of Countries 20 20 20 
Notes: The Drisc/Kraay Standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicates 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (i.e. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
In order to mitigate omitted variables bias, the paper included several relevant control 
variables that influences fiscal balance in an economy. However, in this paper, we categorize 
them into macroeconomic variables, budgetary variables, and political variables. These variables 
are perceived to influence fiscal balance of any economy. Also, in order to highlight the 
influence of oil rents, it is pertinent to further consider the presence of fiscal rules or not. Hence, 
we include the interaction term, where fiscal rule – expenditure rule, debt rule, or revenue usage 
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rules according to IMF classifications - is a dummy (1 = presence of at least one form of fiscal 
rule, and 0 = absence of any form of fiscal rule). 
Fixed Effects and IV Estimations 
Table 4.6 Fixed Effects and IV Estimation Results 
Dependent variable = Fiscal Balance 
 Pooled OLS Estimation 
All Variables + Political  
Variables 
Fixed effects 
Estimation 
IV/2SLS 
Estimation 
Oil Rents 0.305*** 0.395 0.293 
 (0.0668) (4.81)** (5.41)** 
Government Size 0.145** -0.660 -0.379 
 (0.0596) (1.98) (3.39)** 
Interest Rate -0.312 0.275 0.147 
 (0.226) (3.56)** (2.53)* 
Unemployment Rate -0.0478 0.233 -0.309 
 (0.0437) (0.37) (1.40) 
Inflation Rate 1.453* -0.056 -0.047 
 (0.720) (1.40) (1.20) 
logRGDP -0.372*** 12.747 1.658 
 (0.0749) (2.78)* (2.04)* 
logDGDP -2.671*** -0.737 -2.662 
 (0.261) (0.93) (4.24)** 
Control of Corruption 5.064*** 6.801 4.789 
 (1.211) (1.83) (4.24)** 
Oilrents*Fiscal Rule 0.0355 -0.030  
 (0.0601) (0.41)  
_cons -2.124 -102.333 -3.560 
 (6.066) (2.38)* (0.46) 
R
2
 0.457 0.59 0.46 
Observations 320      320 320 
Number of countries 20 20 20 
Drisc/Kraay Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Fixed Effects method is preferred for the estimation of the fiscal balance equation based on the Hausman test (Prob>Chi
2
 = 
0.0529). Time dummies are omitted from the table 
 
In general, the results are consistent with the empirical evidence documented in the 
literature. Oil rent is highly significant at 1% level in the pooled OLS, fixed effects and IV/2SLS 
estimations with the inclusion of the interaction term. The coefficient of this variable is 0.305 in 
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the pooled OLS and 0.4 in the fixed effects estimation. This imply that 1% increase in oil rents 
will increase fiscal balance by +0.305% and +0.4% respectively in oil dependent economies. The 
interaction term (Oilrents*FiscalRule) is not significant. This means that the presence of fiscal 
rule does not have any influence on fiscal balance in oil dependent countries. Hence, whether 
rules that curtails spending, borrowings or the use of oil revenue especially during peak periods 
exists or not, fiscal balance is irresponsive to such changes. 
When we consider the endogeneity problem, and estimate using the IV/2SLS approach, 
the estimate for oil rents decreases to +0.3% increase in fiscal balance for a 1% change in oil 
rents in oil dependent economies, and the interaction term is excluded. We considered country-
specific and time-specific effects in the fixed effects model, and note that a 1% increase in oil 
rents increases the fiscal balance by 0.3%. 
In the case of other variables, of interest is the real GDP per capita. This is because it 
captures the efforts of the government to boost welfare and better the lives of its citizens. Also, 
another variable of interest is the effects on fiscal balance of the control of corruption index. 
Government size is only significant in two regressions, 5% level in pooled OLS and15% level in 
the IV/2SLS regressions. Interest rate is significant at 5% in both the fixed effects and the 
IV/2SLS regressions. As expected log RGDP per capita is significant in three regressions, at 1% 
level in pooled OLS, 5% level in both fixed effects and IV/2SLS estimations with and without 
the interaction terms respectively.  
The control of corruption index is significant at 1% in the pooled OLS and IV/2SLS 
regressions. The effect of a 1% change in the estimated coefficient of this variable on fiscal 
balance ranges between +4.8% and +6.8%. Debt-to-GDP ratio is an important budget item, and it 
is statistically significant in the pooled OLS and IV/2SLS regressions. Thus, a 1% increase in 
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debt-to-GDP ratio, reduces fiscal balance by 2.67% and 2.66% in the pooled OLS and IV/2SLS 
regressions respectively.  
 
Net Oil Exporting Countries 
We estimate all countries first with the famous pooled OLS techniques, and control for country-
specific and time-specific effects 
Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects, and IV/2SLS estimations 
Table 4.7 Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects, and IV/2SLS estimation results 
 Pooled OLS 
Estimation 
All Variables 
+ Political  
Variables 
Fixed effects 
Estimation 
2SLS/IV 
Estimation 
Oil Rents 0.239 0.466 0.181 
 (5.36)** (12.12)** (4.95)** 
Government Size -0.289 -0.452 -0.283 
 (2.18)* (12.36)** (2.25)* 
Interest Rate -0.031 -0.018 -0.041 
 (1.94) (1.18) (2.95)** 
Unemployment Rate -0.153 0.051 -0.151 
 (2.00) (0.69) (2.85)** 
Inflation Rate -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.77) (0.67) (0.43) 
logRGDP 0.989 2.957 1.092 
 (3.59)** (2.86)** (3.94)** 
logDGDP -0.242 -0.563 -0.270 
 (0.95) (2.16)* (1.19) 
Control of Corruption 0.769 0.740 0.491 
 (1.85) (2.38)* (1.72) 
Oilrents*Fiscal Rule -0.119 -0.192 -0.087 
 (2.90)** (4.49)** (2.13)* 
Constant -5.393 -25.552 -5.727 
 (3.27)** (2.85)** (2.72)** 
R
2
 0.24 0.44 0.23 
Observations 1,511               1,511              1,511 
Number of Countries 61 61 61 
Drisc/Kraay Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Given a larger dataset, the results are consistent with the empirical evidence documented 
in the literature, and the interaction term is significant in all the techniques used. This means that 
fiscal rules matter for net oil exporting countries, and influences fiscal balance through the oil 
rents. Oil rent is highly significant at 1% level in the pooled OLS, fixed effects and IV/2SLS 
estimations with the inclusion of the interaction term. The coefficient of this variable is however 
lower than for the oil dependent economies, but higher in the fixed-effects estimations. The least 
square dummy variable (LSDV) approach for fixed effects estimations used showed that an 
increase in oil rents by 1% increases fiscal balance by 0.47%, but drastically reduces in the 
IV/2SLS estimations.  
The interaction term (Oilrents*FiscalRule) is statistically significant. This means that the 
presence of fiscal rule does have some influence on fiscal balance in net oil exporting countries. 
Hence, when rules that curtails spending, borrowings or the use of oil revenue especially during 
peak periods exists, fiscal balance is responsive to such changes. 
When we consider the endogeneity problem, and estimate using the IV/2SLS approach, 
the estimate for oil rents decreases to +0.18% increase in fiscal balance for a 1% change in oil 
rents in selected net oil exporting economies. We considered country-specific and time-specific 
effects in the fixed effects model, and note that a 1% increase in oil rents increases the fiscal 
balance by 0.47%. 
Government size is significant in all three regressions, a 1% increase in government 
spending reduces fiscal balance by 0.29%, 0.45%, and 0.28% in the pooled OLS, fixed effects, 
and IV/2SLS estimations respectively. Interest rate is significant at 5% in the 2SLS estimation, 
and a 1% increase in the real interest rate reduces fiscal balance by 0.04%. For RGDP per capita, 
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a 1% increase, raises the fiscal balance by 0.1%, and is significant at 1% level in all three 
regressions.  
The control of corruption index is significant at 1% only in the fixed effects estimation, 
and a 1% increase, raises fiscal balance by 0.74%. Unemployment rate is also significant only in 
the IV/2SLS estimation, and a percent increase in Ur, reduces fiscal balance by 0.15%. Debt-to-
GDP ratio is only statistically significant in the fixed-effects estimation, and a percent rise, leads 
to 0.26% decrease in fiscal balance. 
 
Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM) 
Given our larger dataset, the GMM technique works to eliminate serial correlation, it 
works to eliminate heteroskedasticity, and it also covers the endogeneity problem. It can be used 
for all forms of data including panel data, and is efficient when we have less time periods 
compared with cross sections over time (i.e. T < or = N). The advantages of GMM over the 
instrumental variables (IV) approach are clear: if heteroskedasticity is present, the GMM 
estimator is more efficient than the simple IV estimator. Also, GMM dynamic panel estimation is 
capable to correct for unobserved country heterogeneity, omitted variable bias, measurement 
error, and endogeneity problems (Bond et al. 2001; Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort 1996). 
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Table 4.8 GMM-IV Estimations 
Dependent Variable  = Fiscal Balance 
 GMM-IV 
without Fiscal 
rules 
GMM-IV with 
Fiscal rules 
L.FiscalBalance 0.533 0.520 
 (3.76)** (4.27)** 
Oil Rents 0.375 0.410 
 (3.69)** (2.73)** 
Government Size 0.267 0.198 
 (0.48) (0.42) 
Interest Rate -0.363 -0.356 
 (2.56)* (2.89)** 
Unemployment Rate 0.007 0.019 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Inflation Rate 0.005 0.003 
 (0.42) (0.45) 
logRGDP -0.709 -0.405 
 (0.16) (0.10) 
logDGDP 0.741 0.765 
 (0.31) (0.31) 
Control of Corruption -3.632 -3.572 
 (1.10) (1.12) 
Oilrents*Fiscal Rule  -0.196 
  (0.31) 
Observations             1,385            1,385 
Number of country               61              61 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
The GMM-IV estimations are conducted for the all net oil exporting countries sample, 
with the interaction term (OilRents*FiscalRule), and also without the interaction term. In using 
this approach, we pay a higher cost in terms of the significance of a number of variables. 
However, as regards the policy variable of interest (Oil Rents), it is significant in the presence or 
absence of fiscal rules, and a rise by 1% increases fiscal balance by 0.38% in the GMM without 
fiscal rules, while an increase of 1% raises fiscal balance by 0.41% in the presence of fiscal rules 
using the panel dynamic estimation method with fiscal rules. The lagged dependent variable is 
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statistically significant across fiscal balance in both GMM, suggesting a critical past effect on the 
present level of fiscal balance in oil exporting countries. 
For the test of included covariates, government size is insignificant in both GMM, as well 
as unemployment rate (UR), inflation rate, real GDP per capita, debt-to-GDP ratio, and the 
control of corruption index. However, the interest rate is statistically significant in both GMM, 
and a 1% increase reduces fiscal balance by 0.36% with or without fiscal rules. Lastly, the 
lagged dependent variable is statistically significant across fiscal balance in both GMM, 
suggesting an important and critical past effect of fiscal balance on the level of fiscal balance.   
 
GMM-IV Diagnostics Conducted 
The Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions which tests for overall validity of 
the instruments and the null hypothesis is that all instruments as a group are exogenous. 
Therefore, higher p-values are desirable to reject the null, and as it is in this paper, Prob > chi
2
 = 
0.216. 
The second test examines the null hypothesis that error term of the differenced equation 
is not serially correlated particularly at the second order (AR2). We do not reject the null 
hypothesis of these tests in this case, since Pr > z = 0.866. 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D. (ShareofWorldOutput ShareofWorld) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L (4/24). (FiscalBalance OilRents) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (1) in first differences: z = -1.47 Pr > z = 0.142 
Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences: z =   0.17 Pr > z = 0.866 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. Restrictions: chi
2
 (34)   = 58.50 Prob > chi2 = 0.006 
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  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. Restrictions: chi
2
 (34)   = 40.16 Prob > chi2 = 0.216 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  IV (ShareofWorldOutput ShareofWorld) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi
2
 (32)   = 37.38 Prob > chi2 = 0.236 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi
2
 (2)    =   2.78 Prob > chi2 = 0.249 
 
Post-Estimation Tests/Robustness Checks 
 
Instrumental Variables: Justification 
To provisionally accept our instrumental variable (IV) as valid, this paper starts by 
investigating whether oil rent is indeed endogenous. Thus, it is important to detect variables in 
the error term that correlates with oil rents. Generally, many variables in the error term may 
correlate with oil rents, thus it is potentially difficult to identify a good IV. Also, since 
endogeneity isn’t only about such correlations, the concern is if the candidate IV is not correlated 
with fiscal balance.  
The verbal argument for share of world oil reserves as a valid IV is that oil rich 
economies do not consider amongst other budgetary items, oil reserves, but instead projected oil 
price. Thus, in the production/drilling/extraction cost of crude oil, and the revenue from the sale 
of crude oil, which are the determinants of oil rents, the country’s share of world reserves is 
considered in the cost, but export price of crude oil is most significant in the revenue part of oil 
rents. Thus, the selected IV (i.e. the country’s share of world crude oil reserves) has no 
correlation with other observable characteristics of fiscal balance, but is significantly correlated 
with oil rents, which is assumed to be potentially endogenous, and affects fiscal balance only 
through oil rents. 
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Table 4.9 IV: Test for Instrument Relevance: 
 OilRents 
ShareofWorldOutput 1.608 
 (18.65)** 
_cons 7.354 
 (21.00)** 
R
2
 0.19 
N          1,525 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
Test of endogeneity (Oil Rents are indeed endogenous or not) 
H0: variables are exogenous: The null hypothesis is that we could have just used regular pooled 
OLS or the fixed effects regression without necessarily using IV regression. 
Table 4.10 Tests of endogeneity 
Selected Oil Dependent economies Net Oil Exporting Economies 
Durbin (score) chi2 (1) = .060299  
(p = 0.8060) 
Durbin (score) chi2(1) =  4.09414  
 (p = 0.0430) 
Wu-Hausman F (1,310) = .058426  
(p = 0.8092) 
Wu-Hausman F(1,1500) =  4.07538   
(p = 0.0437) 
Robust score chi2 (1) = .056565  
(p = 0.8120) 
Robust score chi2(1)  =  2.73896   
(p = 0.0979) 
Robust regression F (1,310) = .054772  
(p = 0.8151) 
Robust regression F(1,1500) =   3.0852   
(p = 0.0792) 
Both the Durbin (score) statistics as well as the Wu-Hausman statistic have very large p-values 
which tells us that we do not reject the null hypothesis that Oil rents are exogenous, and not 
endogenous. 
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First stage regression statistics (for weak instruments) 
Here we report the first-stage regression statistic in order to look for weak instruments, 
i.e. the correlation between the instruments and the supposed endogenous variable i.e. Oil Rents. 
We are interested in the Partial R-squared which measures the correlation between oil rents and 
share of world output after we have partial out the effects of other control variables.  
Since the Partial R-squared is 58% and our robust F-statistic is 130.669, which is much 
larger than any of the critical values shown in our table, we reject the null hypothesis that our 
instruments are weak. This suggests that we have good instruments in this case. 
Table 4.11 First stage regression statistics 
H0: Instruments are weak 
Variable: Oil Rents 
Selected Oil Dependent 
Economies 
Net Oil Exporting Economies 
R-squared 0.6668 0.3561 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6549 0.3518 
Partial R-squared 0.5839 0.1966 
Robust  F (4, 308)130.669 96.9266 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
# of endogenous regressors 1 1 
# of excluded instruments 4 2 
 
Test of overidentifying restrictions (for instruments validity) 
Here, the p-values for the Sargan as well as the Basmann tests are large which suggests 
that our instruments are valid and that our models are correctly specified. 
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Table 4.12 Test of Overidentifying restrictions 
Selected Oil dependent economies Net Oil Exporting countries 
Sargan chi2 (3)  = 34.5295 (p = 0.0000) Sargan chi2 (1) = 42.9081 (p = 0.0000) 
Basmann chi2 (3) = 37.2546 (p = 0.0000) Basmann chi2 (1) = 43.8407 (p = 0.0000) 
Score chi2 (3)= 14.8166 (p = 0.0020) Score chi2 (1) = 7.74959 (p = 0.0054) 
 
Connecting the importance of fiscal rules for the Effectiveness of Oil Rents in improving 
Fiscal Balance 
Inferring from the findings of this study, we can deduce that oil rents is more effective in 
improving fiscal balance in net oil exporting countries, and fiscal rule is significant, as compared 
to the category of highly oil dependent economies, where fiscal rule is insignificant in all 
estimation technique employed to overcome empirical challenges. This ineffectiveness of fiscal 
rules (Debt, Revenue, and Government expenditure – Size) must have been attributable to 
overreliance on crude oil, inappropriate application, and untimely adoption of IMF’s framework 
on fiscal policies and strategies by less self-reliant countries. Thus, these countries are largely 
exposed to external oil price shocks, and suffer from internal fiscal crisis, in the event of rising 
crude oil exploration costs, alongside falling revenue. 
The key decisions that underscores the establishment of fiscal rules arises from the trends 
in fiscal balance/Budget deficits of countries overtime. Deficits maintained a high hand in public 
finance, and thus necessitated the need for fiscal adjustments in order to standardize fiscal 
sustainability. Moreover, the rationale behind such reasoning is that government’s finances 
responds to set budget constraints, external shocks – input or output, price shocks, past/lagged 
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fiscal balances of the government, and the political will to support or not to spending for high 
categories of spending ministries, agencies, or parastatal, such as defense, welfare, education, 
amongst others. 
It is worth noting that the simple view of fiscal rules is that a substantial part of budgetary 
items, be limited, and a fiscal indicator be used to monitor the reaction of government’s finances 
overtime. Hence, policy makers should reiterate the need for the government to set up, and 
follow religiously, standardized fiscal balance rules, debt rules, expenditure or government size 
rules, and revenue usage rules. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary of the Study 
This study achieved its main objective of investigating oil rent’s effect on fiscal balance 
in the presence of fiscal rules for oil dependent economies, and for selected net oil exporting 
countries, while controlling for the effects of some macroeconomic, budgetary, and political 
variables, such as government size, interest rate, unemployment rate, inflation rate, real GDP per 
capita, debt-to-GDP ratio, and control of corruption. The study relied on the strengths of past 
studies like those of Mika Tujula and Guido Wolswijk (2004) by establishing the specific effects 
of oil rents for crude oil endowed economies, as one of the main determinants of fiscal balance. 
This establishes the importance of oil rents, amongst other previously identified macroeconomic, 
budgetary, and political covariates. Thus, we have attempted to overcome the shortcomings of 
studies that make generalized conclusions for the main determinants of fiscal balance for all 
countries, without highlighting specific variables that takes a huge chunk of the effects for 
specific natural resource endowed economies.   
Given large macroeconomic panel dataset, our empirical analysis solved the possibility of 
endogeneity, simultaneity bias and unobserved heterogeneity of oil rents and fiscal balance by 
the main econometric technique i.e. using an instrumental variable approach based on Dynamic 
Panel estimators or the General Method of Moment (GMM). This is used in comparison with 
estimations from pooled OLS, LSDV fixed effects, and the IV/2SLS techniques (using each 
country’s share of world output as instrument). Our pre-estimation diagnostics showed that the 
GMM approach may not be applicable to the small sample, and we suspected that the IV/2SLS 
method may also be weak in testing our hypothesis for the oil dependent economies with N = 20 
and T = 16, and therefore we maintained the LSDV Fixed effects estimations as our main result 
for this category of sample countries selected. We also utilized the Drisc/Kraay standard errors, 
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as well as the robust standard errors, which are standard errors robust to cross-sectional 
dependence and heteroskedasticity of unknown forms respectively, that exists in large 
macroeconomic panel data where N > T. 
Our estimation results shows that in countries with fiscal rules, there is insignificant 
reaction of fiscal balance to changes in oil rents shocks, and the impact is weak. We find also 
that welfare spending, which was captured by the real GDP per capita, affects fiscal balance, and 
so does the budgetary variable, i.e. debt-to-GDP ratio, and the ability of the government to curb 
corruption and mismanagement of funds, which is politically motivated. 
 
5.2 Policy Recommendations 
The findings suggest that oil rents, government spending, welfare related spending, and 
the level of corruption, have significantly influenced the amount of budget deficits from 1991 – 
2015 in countries with at least one form of fiscal rules. The findings have some implications for 
policymakers, for fiscal management and fiscal sustainability in resource rich countries. First, 
highlighting the unpredictability of crude oil price shocks, especially the timing, and external 
economic effects is important, and thus should not be a budgetary variable. 
In mid-2015, due to the oil price glut, several countries (including Nigeria, and other oil-
rich sub-Saharan African countries) responded negatively with fall in fiscal sustainability, fiscal 
crisis, and eventually economic recession. Although global growth rate of GDP has been on the 
decline, in almost oil dependent economies, and investment costs had been on the increase in 
many countries, oil rents had inevitably improved in the years prior to 2015. This suggests 
therefore that, had basic macroeconomic, budgetary, and political fundamentals been adequately 
catered for, fiscal balance would have improved in the period of falling oil rents. 
56 
 
Aside from oil rents, oil dependent economies should pay attention to the use of fiscal 
rules, to reduce budget deficits. This finding highlights the significance of other variables asides 
from our policy variable to influence fiscal balance. Accordingly, other policy implications 
consist of focusing on adequate environment for investors in oil and gas sectors, which includes 
favourable long-term and short-term lending rates, and corruption reducing efforts in public and 
private sector services, as well as improving the overall basics of economic performance 
indicators. 
For recurrent spending, borrowing should not be encouraged, except where such loans are 
carved for capital projects that yields ripple effects in the overall economy. This will limit the 
size of the government, and put the primary balance of the government in a reasonable shape.  
 
5.3 Limitations of the Study 
This study is not without limitations. First, we could not include some of the key 
determinants of fiscal balance that splits among macroeconomic, budgetary, and political 
variables due to the absence of complete time-series data for the years under consideration. 
Second, we certainly acknowledge the fact that some other changes have since taken place in the 
composition of crude oil reserves and the computation of oil rents in the net oil exporting 
countries, including the new focus on shale oil and other forms of energy sources that might have 
influenced our estimates. Nevertheless, we make an effort to control for these changes through 
the inclusion of country and time fixed effects, our estimates may still show minor biases due to 
these changes. 
Third, the dataset we use is aggregate annual data at the national level. It will be useful to 
further consider household-level data to examine the disaggregated welfare effects of falling 
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fiscal balance on the unit level. This is a possible extension for future research in oil dependent 
economies. Despite the above concerns, the present study significantly enhances our 
understanding of the role of oil rents on fiscal balance in net oil exporting countries today. 
 
5.4 Suggested Areas for Further Study 
For the purpose of future studies, it is recommended that considerable attempts should be 
made to disaggregate revenue, and accommodate more sources of revenue in the empirical model 
used to capture fiscal balance, and the government’s budget constraint. This will therefore help 
capture the behaviour of the included covariates to different categories of government revenue 
sources – a disaggregated analysis. Other studies could narrow down our sample even further to 
other groups with similar analytical characteristics so as to arrive at even more specific results, 
within and between groups. 
Furthermore, an understanding of the effectiveness of oil rents at individual country’s 
sub-national government’s fiscal balances can provide information on the source of budget 
deficits. Since most of the cumulative oil revenue are usually divided among a varying levels of 
government using some revenue allocation formula, each provincial government has 
responsibility to utilize such funds and maintain high fiscal balance. Also, in the event of a fiscal 
crisis due to oil price glut for oil dependent economies, sub-national governments usually 
influence the lives of the people more directly through untimely payment of salaries to civil 
service workers. This causes fall in welfare, and has ripple effects on the economy. 
In light of this therefore, further research might provide robust analysis at the country’s 
provincial or regional level and inspect impact of oil rents at the subnational government level. 
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6 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of Net Oil exporting countries included in the study 
1 Algeria* 31 Kuwait* 
2 Angola* 32 Libya* 
3 Argentina 33 Lithuania 
4 Australia 34 Malaysia 
5 Azerbaijan, Republic of* 35 Mexico* 
6 Bangladesh 36 Mongolia 
7 Belarus 37 Netherlands 
8 Bolivia 38 New Zealand 
9 Brazil 39 Nigeria* 
10 Cameroon 40 Norway* 
11 Canada 41 Oman* 
12 Chad* 42 Pakistan 
13 China, P.R.: Mainland 43 Papua New Guinea 
14 Colombia 44 Peru 
15 Cote d'Ivoire 45 Philippines 
16 Czech Republic 46 Poland 
17 Denmark 47 Qatar* 
18 DR Congo 48 Romania 
19 Ecuador* 49 Russian Federation* 
20 Egypt 50 Saudi Arabia* 
21 France 51 Slovak Republic 
22 Germany 52 South Africa 
23 Ghana 53 Spain 
24 Greece 54 Sudan 
25 Hungary 55 Thailand 
26 Indonesia 56 United Arab Emirates* 
27 Iran, Islamic Republic of* 57 United Kingdom 
28 Israel 58 United States 
29 Italy 59 Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de* 
30 Kazakhstan* 60 Vietnam 
  61 Yemen, Republic of 
Brunei Darussalam* and Iraq* are also considered among the oil dependent economies 
*Oil Dependent Economies 
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